How to test whether an AI agent remembers another user's data
Write a synthetic secret as one user, return as another, and check every place it can reappear.
Regex, NER or LLM judge: what each PII detection tier catches in agent traces
Precision is easy. Recall on contextual leaks is not. Measured numbers for each detection tier.
The answer is clean. What about the file your agent wrote?
Audit the CSV, report and temporary file alongside the chat response, with a runnable trace example.
Why output guardrails miss most AI agent data leaks
One real run, read twice: once at the answer, once across every channel.
Your agent's debug logs are another data export
Keep useful operational evidence while testing what the application sends to its logging backend.
MCP security: how sensitive data leaves through tool calls, and how to stop it
Over-sharing, hijacked recipients and changed tools: the three ways a tool call leaks, and a gateway that decides each one.
Build a privacy regression test with synthetic canaries
A small, runnable test that checks both the detector and the recording path before trusting a pass.
How to add an AI agent privacy test to CI in four steps
From a recorded run to a failing pull request, with the policy file and the workflow.
AI agent security testing tools at the end of 2026: what changed, and where privacy fits
Checked against each project’s own pages on 14 November 2026, with the links.
Data minimization for AI agents: who should see which field
Reading data is necessary. Copying it everywhere is not. Turning that distinction into a rule a machine can check.
What defenses change in a multi-agent system, and what they leave untouched
The defense table from the study: strong on the answer, silent on the handoff, and one prototype that is not.
How the AgentLeak benchmark was built: 1,000 scenarios, 4,979 traces and what we checked
Scenario schema, expert review, a three-tier detector and the checks behind the numbers.
The Interlocutor Effect: models leak more personal data when the reader is an agent
Same policy, same data, one sentence changed: who the model thinks is reading.
Seven pathways, two of them internal: where agent data leaks, channel by channel
C1 to C7: final output, inter-agent messages, tool input and output, memory, logs and artifacts.
In 41.7% of multi-agent runs, the leak hides behind a clean answer
What the AgentLeak benchmark found when it read every channel of a multi-agent run, not only the answer.