Research notes on AI agent privacy.

What we learn measuring where agents leak data: in handoffs, memory, tool calls and logs. Every number links to the study or the run it came from.

RSS feed

#thesamestore,twoidentitiessessionAmemorystoresessionB+------------++--------------++------------+|||||||CANARY_A|-------->|CANARY_A|----->|CANARY_A||||||||writes||user_a/*||reads|+------------++--------------++------------+1Awritesanote,scopedbyitsnameonly2Basksaroutinequestion3thenotecomesbacktoBanamespaceorganizes;thecodemustenforceit

How to test whether an AI agent remembers another user's data

Write a synthetic secret as one user, return as another, and check every place it can reappear.

Engineering

#recallon1,000labelledsegmentspatterns[###.............................]0.080+NER[######..........................]0.180LLMjudge[##############################..]0.926allthree[##############################..]0.934------------------------------patternsneverraiseafalsealarm:precision1.000andtheymissmostofwhatissensitive

Regex, NER or LLM judge: what each PII detection tier catches in agent traces

Precision is easy. Recall on contextual leaks is not. Measured numbers for each detection tier.

Research

#theanswerandthefile+--------------------++-------------------------------+|final_output||shared-report.csv||||||Therearetwelve.|--->|status,private_note||||||||open,CANARY_EXPORT_NOTE_7Q9||clean|||+--------------------+|closed,#################||||generated_file|+-------------------------------+thereplyfulfilledtherequest;theexportserializedthewholerecordauditthefile,notonlythemessagethatannouncesit

The answer is clean. What about the file your agent wrote?

Audit the CSV, report and temporary file alongside the chat response, with a runnable trace example.

Engineering

#onefilter,sixexits+------------#tool_callleak||+------------#inter_agent_messageleak|+-----------+|||+------------#shared_memoryleak|agent|-----||||+-----------++------------#logleak|theanswerpasses|+------------ogenerated_fileopen4of8secrets|leftelsewhere|+--[filter]--ofinal_outputclean

Why output guardrails miss most AI agent data leaks

One real run, read twice: once at the answer, once across every channel.

Engineering

#whattheexporterreceives+--------------------------++--------------------------+|redactedbeforeexport||debugcapturelefton||||||opcustomer_lookup||opcustomer_lookup||statustimeout||statustimeout||errorUpstreamTimeout||errorUpstreamTimeout||args[removed]||args################||||||kept:whatoperationsneed|exported:thepayload|+--------------------------++--------------------------+app---->collector---->logbackendthebackendisarecipient,evenwhenonlyemployeescanopenit

Your agent's debug logs are another data export

Keep useful operational evidence while testing what the application sends to its logging backend.

Security

#everytools/callisjudged+---------++-------------++-----------+||tools/call||||agent|--------->|gateway|--------->|server|||||||+---------++-------------++-----------+policy:datatype,recipient,purpose------------------------------------------------------------#allowthecallgoesthroughunchanged#redactonefieldreplaced,thetaskfinishes#blockadenyrulenamestheflow

MCP security: how sensitive data leaves through tool calls, and how to stop it

Over-sharing, hijacked recipients and changed tools: the three ways a tool call leaks, and a gateway that decides each one.

Security

#plantit,thenlookforitplantedCANARY_SUPPORT_7Q9channelcontractseen------------------------------------------------------------tool_responsemayreceiveoyeslogmustnot#foundtool_callmustnot.nonefinal_outputmustnot.none[x]positivecontrol:theplantedleakisfound[x]negativecontrol:sourceaccessisnotaleak

Build a privacy regression test with synthetic canaries

A small, runnable test that checks both the detector and the recording path before trusting a pass.

Guide

#pullrequestchecks$agentleakrun--fail-under80RiskIndex0.440privacy56/1004of8secretsleakedexit1------------------------------------------------------------[x]unittestspass[x]buildpass[]agentprivacyblockedreportkeptasanartifact:agentleak.json

How to add an AI agent privacy test to CI in four steps

From a recorded run to a failing pull request, with the policy file and the workflow.

Guide

#threelayers,threequestions+----------------------------------------------------------+|attackcanitbepushedtomisbehave?||||promptfoo,garak,PyRIT|+----------------------------------------------------------++----------------------------------------------------------+|datadidprivatedatacrossaboundary?||||AgentLeak|+----------------------------------------------------------++----------------------------------------------------------+|surfaceiswhatitloadsrisky?||||SnykAgentScan|+----------------------------------------------------------+

AI agent security testing tools at the end of 2026: what changed, and where privacy fits

Checked against each project’s own pages on 14 November 2026, with the links.

Landscape

#whataschedulerneeds,whatitwassentneededsent------------------------------------------------------------name##appointment##diagnosis.#notneededssn.#notneedednotes..------------------------------------------------------------sentminusneededisthefinding

Data minimization for AI agents: who should see which field

Reading data is necessary. Copying it everywhere is not. Turning that distinction into a rule a machine can check.

Compliance

#leakrateundereachdefensenodefensefinal[##################....................]48%internal[############..........................]31%privacypromptfinal[#######...............................]19%internal[###########...........................]29%outputsanitizerfinal[......................................]1%internal[############..........................]31%

What defenses change in a multi-agent system, and what they leave untouched

The defense table from the study: strong on the answer, silent on the handoff, and one prototype that is not.

Research

#fromscenariostotraceshealthcare250---||+--------------++------------+finance250---||1,000||4,979|--->||--->||legal250---||scenarios||traces||+--------------++------------+corporate250---|x5models,21lostwhofindstheleak,firsttiertocatchit####======----------------------------------------------8%canary10%pattern82%LLMjudge

How the AgentLeak benchmark was built: 1,000 scenarios, 4,979 traces and what we checked

Scenario schema, expert review, a three-tier detector and the checks behind the numbers.

Research

#PIIleakrate,3,464interactionshuman,text[#########################.....]83.3%agent,text[############################..]94.8%human,JSON[#########################.....]82.6%agent,JSON[#########################.....]83.1%------------------------------+11.5ppagent-framedrecipient,inplaintext+0.6ppwithaJSONschema

The Interlocutor Effect: models leak more personal data when the reader is an agent

Same policy, same data, one sentence changed: who the model thinks is reading.

Research

#sevenpathways,twooftheminternalC1finaloutputexternal------27.2%C2inter-agentinternal------68.8%C3toolinputexternal------sampledC4tooloutputexternal------SDKcaseC5memoryinternal------46.7%C6logsexternal------sampledC7artifactsexternal------SDKcasefullscale:C1,C2,C5.sampleorcasestudy:therest

Seven pathways, two of them internal: where agent data leaks, channel by channel

C1 to C7: final output, inter-agent messages, tool input and output, memory, logs and artifacts.

Research

#4,979traces,sharewithaleakinter-agentC2[#####################.........]68.8%memoryC5[##############................]46.7%finaloutputC1[########......................]27.2%------------------------------cleananswer,[#############.................]41.7%internalleakH12,076tracesanoutputreviewwouldhavepassed

In 41.7% of multi-agent runs, the leak hides behind a clean answer

What the AgentLeak benchmark found when it read every channel of a multi-agent run, not only the answer.

Research